

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

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CINCLANT PRIORITY

COMICEDEFOR

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AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

JCS

ISA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

S E C R E T REYKJAVIK 0839

NOFORN

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MARR IC NATO

SUBJECT: IDF ARTICLE VII NEGOTIATIONS

REF: REYKJAVIK 824

1. I MET AGAIN WITH FONMIN AGUSTSSON AT HIS REQUEST THIS AFTER-
NOON. HE IS A MAN OF MOODS AND WAS SOMEWHAT DEPRESSED. HE SAID
MAGNUS KJARTANSSON HAS REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE COMPROMISE OFFERED
IN ORDER TO KEEP HIM FROM MEMBERSHIP ON THE ART VII NEGOTIATING
TEAM (PARA 7 REFTTEL). KJARTANSSON CLAIMS PRIMIN SOME TIME AGO
AGREED TO HIS REQUEST. FONMIN SAID SINCE PRIMIN IS STILL ON
VACATION AND WILL BE ABSENT UNTIL AUGUST 1, HE CANNOT PRESENTLY

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VERIFY THIS, BUT IF TRUE, WE ARE IN FOR BIG TROUBLE.

2. FONMIN ALSO STATED AT CABINET MEETING KJARTANSSON DEMANDED OFFICIAL NEGOTIATIONS COMMENCE IMMEDIATELY, BUT HE WAS ABLE TO ARGUE USG NEEDED TIME AND SHOULD WAIT FOR NATO REPORT. CABINET AGREED WITH FONMIN PROVIDED NEGOTIATIONS COMMENCED NO LATER THAN MID-SEPTEMBER. FOR PRESS GUIDANCE, IF ASKED, FONMIN AND I AGREED TO SAY OFFICIAL NEGOTIATIONS WILL COMMENCE UPON RECEIPT OF THE NATO REPORT, WITHOUT SPECIFYING DATE WHEN THIS EXPECTED, BUT THAT INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN HELD BETWEEN FONMIN AND US AMBASSADOR WILL CONTINUE IN MEANTIME.

3. FONMIN SAID KJARTANSSON IS THREATENING TO CAUSE FALL OF GOVT IN JANUARY 1974 AFTER END OF SIX-MONTH ART V11 PERIOD IF GOVT SUBMITS FAVORABLE RECOMMENDATION TO ALTHING FOR RETENTION OF IDF. FONMIN SAID THERE ARE TOO MANY PEOPLE IN GOVT WHO WILL CAVE IN TO KJARTANSSON UNLESS USG IS WILLING MAKE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF MILITARY MANPOWER. FONMIN SAID HE FELT THAT AT PRESENT ANYWAY, TOO MANY MEMBERS OF ALTHING MIGHT CAVE IN ALSO. THIS IS REASON HE SAID HIS DEFINITION OF "SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS" (REFTEL PARA ONE) WAS SO HIGH. I CAUTIONED FONMIN NOT TO LOCK HIMSELF IN ON THE REDUCTION OF ONE-THIRD SAYING THAT IT WAS UNFAIR TO US AND WILL PUT HIM AND FRIENDS OF THE IDF ON THE DEFENSIVE IF STUDIES SHOW SUCH A FIGURE IS TOO HIGH. HE ASSURED ME THAT HE DID NOT MENTION THE FIGURE IN THE CABINET THE OTHER DAY. HE STUCK ONLY TO THE WORD "SUBSTANTIAL".

4. IN THE COURSE OF OUR DISCUSSION, THE FONMIN REMARKED TO ME THAT THE NEW FRENCH AMBASSADOR (LATOIRS DEJEAN) HAS BEEN TALKING TO PEOPLE ABOUT THE BASE AND THE NEED FOR ITS RETENTION. FONMIN REMARKED THAT THE FRENCH ARE IN A POOR POSITION TO BE A MEDIATOR ON THE BASE ISSUE SINCE FRANCE PULLED ITS MILITARY FORCES OUT OF NATO. I REPLIED THAT I WAS NOT AWARE THAT FRANCE HAD BEEN ASKED TO ACT AS A GO-BETWEEN. DEJEAN HAD PAID A CALL ON ME YESTERDAY AND HE SHOWED GREAT INTEREST IN THE BASE, BUT DEJEAN TOLD ME THAT IT WAS BECAUSE HIS PREVIOUS POSITION FOR THE PAST FIVE YEARS WAS ON THE NATO INTERNATIONAL STAFF. I SAID I FELT SURE HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH PEOPLE REFLECTED HIS BACKGROUND. I REMINDED THE FONMIN, HOWEVER, THAT PRESIDENT POMPIDOU HAD REMARKED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE IDF TO REMAIN IN ICELAND, AND FRANCE SHARED THE SAME VIEW ON THIS AS ALL THE OTHER NATO COUNTRIES. FONMIN SAID
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HE WAS AWARE OF THIS AND THAT JOUBERT HAD ALSO TALKED TO HIM ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE IDF IN ICELAND.

5. FONMIN REMARKED THAT IT WAS HYPOCRITICAL OF DENMARK AND NORWAY TO TELL ICELAND THAT THE IDF MUST REMAIN IN ICELAND. HE EXPLAINED BY SAYING THOSE COUNTRIES WANT ICELAND TO HAVE FOREIGN FORCES, BUT THAT THEY DO NOT WANT FOREIGN FORCES TO BE STATIONED IN THEIR HOMELAND. I REMARKED THERE WAS A BIG DIFFERENCE

BETWEEN THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES AND ICELAND BECAUSE THOSE COUNTRIES HAVE AN ARMED FORCE OF THEIR OWN WHEREAS ICELAND DOES NOT. THEREFORE, I DID NOT AGREE THAT THEIR POSITION WAS HYPOCRITICAL. I SAID I WAS NOT AWARE OF THESE COUNTRIES MAKING SUCH DEMARCHES FORMALLY OR INFORMALLY TO ICELAND, BUT THAT I THOUGHT THESE DEMARCHES REFLECTED AN OBJECTIVE AWARENESS OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC SITUATION AND THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE BASE.

6. FONMIN TOLD ME THAT HIS CLOSEST ADVISERS ON THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE GIZURARSSON (PARA 4 REFTEL) AND TOMAS KARLSSON PA (ASSOCIATE EDITOR OF THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY DAILY TIMINN). HE ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO GIVE THE TWO OF THEM A TOUR OF THE BASE AND A DETAILED BRIEFING ON THE BASE OPERATIONS. I REPLIED THAT I WOULD LOOK INTO THE MATTER BUT FELT THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFICULTIES.

7. THE CONVERSATION ENDED WITH THE FONMIN ASSURING ME THAT HE PERSONALLY WAS STILL VERY MUCH IN FAVOR OF RETENTION OF THE IDF UNIMPAIRED BUT THAT HE WOULD NEED COOPERATION FROM USG TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE.

8. COMMENT: TODAY'S CONVERSATION DOES NOT ADD ANYTHING MATERIALLY NEW TO WHAT WE ALREADY KNOW. HOWEVER, IT DOES SHOW A CERTAIN SENSITIVITY ON THE PART OF THE FONMIN AND PERHAPS OTHER CABINET MINISTERS ABOUT OTHER NATIONS TELLING ICELAND WHAT IS GOOD FOR ICELAND. I WOULD APPRECIATE BEING ADVISED IF MY ASSUMPTION ON FRENCH AMBASSADOR DEJEAN'S VIGOROUS INTEREST IN THE BASE IS AS I HAVE DESCRIBED IT, I. E., AN INTEREST THAT IS GENERATED BY HIS BACKGROUND RATHER THAN BY INSTRUCTION.
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